Yesterday I attended a lecture hosted by the South African Institute for International Affairs (SAIIA). The guest for the evening was Irina Filatova – concerning her rank, position, and background I have no information. She was speaking on Vladimir Putin’s legacy in post-Soviet Russia and the trajectory of Russia’s role in global affairs in the next decade or so. Not knowing exactly what to expect from the lecture, and not knowing from what perspective the speaker would arrive, I entered the salon with quite an open mind and few presuppositions as to her slant or purpose – thankfully, in the end, for her lecture was both incendiary and thought-provoking. Many of the broader topics she broached in her discussion of Russia’s current state and the direction in which the country is headed have parallels with both South Africa and the United States; in this so-called “multipolar” post-Cold War world the interaction between nations and their leadership systems has become increasingly tenuous and unpredictable – no thanks to the likes of the Russians, as it were.
Filatova’s lecture brought up several vital points of discussion concerning Russia’s role and ideal position in today’s global economy. The following points are not her thoughts but mine, as inspired by her argument and what she revealed about the Russian national ethos, mentality, psychology, and its effects on the larger international picture.
Point 1: Putin is popular. According to Filatova, statistics showed that Putin’s approval rating hovered around 85% for the majority of his time in the office of the presidency. Furthermore, this indicates (according to Filatova), that the post-Soviet government under Yeltsin was seen as being too weak, too conciliatory, and too subservient to Western interests. Putin, on the other hand, recalled more of the tsarist legacy of recreating the Russian self-images as an independent, sovereign, and ultimately powerful state. He achieved this by doing several things: first and foremost, despite his unimposing physical stature and his generally antagonistic relationship with the Russian press, Putin established himself as a strong executive unwilling to cooperate in all cases with the US and NATO (thereby reestablishing Russian sovereignty). Filatova pointed to the US’s intervention in Kosovo as the greatest infringement on Russian sovereignty in the post-Soviet world, and one that pushed Putin to criticize the West, thereby polarizing the largest former Soviet state and positioning it in a clearly anti-American stance. Second, Putin managed to neutralize nearly all internal resistance by --- According to Filatova, the current multiparty system (and thereby Kremlin representation) is actually a product of a realignment of party loyalty after the fall of the Soviet Union, and particularly after Yeltsin’s rule. In other words, in order to neutralize the greatest threat, that of the Communist Party, Putin encouraged the formation of a leftist party (the United Russia Party) which diluted far-left opposition by providing a more moderate platform. Similarly, Yeltsin’s young reform party on the liberal, right-wing side, most sympathetic to the West, actually had the only real power aside from Putin’s party itself. Basically by simultaneously splintering existing party structures and reorganizing party delineation Putin “neutralized” (not “suppressed”) opposition. Filatova’s clincher? The Kremlin created its own, largely controllable and domesticated, opposition.
The parallels in the current South African political structure are incredible. From her description, Putin’s ruling party most closely resembles the structure of the ANC, which has itself neutralized leftist opposition by working closely with the South African Communist Party, agreeing to acquiesce to some of their demands without compromising a more mainstream party line (and vision of a socialist, but not too socialist, South African society). Yeltsin’s opposition party, on the other hand, could see its twin in the Democratic Alliance, the party that is threatening ANC domination in some specific sectors (or regions) in SA – namely the Western Cape. Furthermore, Putin’s constitutional liberalism (loose constructionism, if you will) which allowed him to remain in power in a new position of “prime minister” while also hand-picking his own replacement in the presidency (Medvedev) strongly recalls Jacob Zuma’s positioning within the ANC power structure, and his influence in recalling president Mbeki and hand-picking his temporary replacement – Kgalema Motlanthe. Talk about constitutional liberalism – “uh, yeah, about that whole ‘election’ requirement – let’s just insert some fine print here.” The workings of democracy in transition astound those of us who take for granted that our democratic system is relatively set in stone.
This brings us to Point 2: If nothing else, Filatova’s discussion of the current perception of Putin’s role, his popularity, and the Russian reaction to international criticism demonstrates the difficulty and ultimate failures of superimposing democracy on nations and states without a tradition in expecting democracy. Both in terms of institutional democracy (free press, independent judiciary, legitimate lines of intra-governmental communication and accountability) and literal democracy (free and fair elections, voter choice, and an educated and informed populace) Russia’s loyalty to Putin indicates a lack of experience. Here the parallels to South Africa are less clear – generally the press in this country has bigger bite than even the States, and the people, though perhaps uninformed and tending toward the emotional in the ballot box, are vocal and critical. Russia remains closed to a close analysis of people’s freedom in choosing candidates or voicing criticism against their government.
Point 3: Despite the apparent lack of popular criticism of Russian governmental systems and figures, the Russian people are happy to criticize other governments for their treatment of Russia. Apparently the general reaction of the Russian people to the international uproar against perceived Russian aggression in Georgia led the majority of Ruskies to cry “foul, no fair!” – the general sentiment being, “If the United States can do it, why can’t we?” Well, holy Cold War Part Deux, Batman! If every country thought that way (and probably almost every country does think that way) we’d be in a perpetual Orwellian state of war! Luckily for international affairs, at some point only the US can both talk the talk and walk the walk, though Russia’s display in Georgia is certainly an attempt to demonstrate some newfound strength – or renewed sense of imperial purpose. We all knew a second Cold War was coming around, but I’m not sure if anyone thought Russia would be involved. My impression is that we’ve got a couple of fighters unwilling to let the last round of knockouts die – Russia’s swinging at air in Georgia and the States are blinking through the pain of a debilitating financial crisis. The only one left standing will probably the Asian countries happily drinking their imported beer and digging through the goldmines of Africa in the casino next to the arena floor. Extending this metaphor further is probably not a great idea, so I’ll leave it at that.
Afterword: After Filatova’s address, one audience member stood and thanked the speaker for her “informed” and “thrilling” discussion. He then proceeded to admit that basically everything she had said about the Russian people, their mentality, their loyalty to autocratic rule and their apathy toward constitutional democracy, combined with their bitterness towards the West and their feeling of unfair play, “scared the living daylights out of him.” Why? Because, he argued, that is the exact description of interwar Germany under Hitler’s Third Reich. This comparison, though incendiary, is still instructive, and Filatova’s reaction was impressive. She agreed that on the surface the similarities are frightening, but that the bottom line, in her educated opinion, was that Russia is overestimating its own strength. That in general, the tragedy of Russian history, from Peter to Catherine to Lenin to Stalin, is that Russia always overestimates its own importance in world affairs. That is bets too high on what it has to offer, when at some point, if the Chinese want Russian oil, they’ll take it, and if the US wants to intervene in Russian spheres of influence, they will, and if Georgia wants to declare independence and fight for it, it will do so with international support. And that the Russian complaints against the unfair, hypocritical West are meaningless because the world will keep on spinning whether Russia stamps her feet or not.
Yet maybe if Russia’s mistake is overestimating its own strength, the easiest trap for the West (or the East, for that matter) to fall into is to underestimate Russia’s strategic importance in terms of natural resources and historic military might – in other words, disarmament. Russia may not be able to fight this fight on their own, but they won’t have to once they’ve positioned themselves favorable in a coalition with other marginalized by collaboratively powerful countries: Nicaragua, Venezuela… China? And maybe that’s the card they’re playing closest to the chest.
